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1. What is fundamental in a quantum description of the world?
It is a matter of debate what the basic entities of the universe are in quantum theory.
Expanding the metaphor used by Griffiths at this conference, one might imagine that the
conversations of the three meals of the day could be restricted to three possible answers:
(a) Amplitudes (subject of lunch conversation). One might imagine formulating
quantum theory in the morning and concluding at lunch that complex amplitudes were
the fundamental entities. Each fine-grained history hi might be assigned an amplitude
A[hi] = e
iS[hi], (1)
where S[hi] is the action (in units of h¯) of that history (Feynman and Hibbs 1965). The
fine-grained histories could then be combined into a weighted group of histories α (called
a coarse-grained history) with amplitude
A[α] =
∑
i
wα [hi]e
iS[hi], (2)
where wα is an α-dependent weight functional of the fine-grained histories hi. For
example, A[α] could be given by a path integral over a set of histories, so that wα could
be 1 if hi is in the set and 0 if hi is not. More generally, wα[hi] might be weighted
by the complex amplitude for the initial configuration of the history hi. If α consisted of
all of the histories that reached a certain final configuration, and no others, A[α] would
be what is called the wavefunction evaluated at that final configuration. A problem with
these amplitudes as basic entities, however, is that it is not clear what direct interpretation
they have.
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(b) Probabilities for decohering sets of histories (subject of dinner conversation)
(Griffiths 1984; Omne`s 1988a, 1988b, 1988c, 1989; Gell-Mann and Hartle 1990; Hartle
1990a, 1990b, 1991). One might imagine interpreting the amplitudes in the afternoon so
that the (unnormalized) probability associated with each coarse-grained history α is
p(α) = |A(α)|2. (3)
In order to get a set of probabilities obeying the usual axioms of probability, one then
needs a set of α’s such that for any pair (α 6= α′),
p(α+ α′) ≡ |A(α) +A(α′)|2 = p(α) + p(α′) ≡ |A(α)|2 + |A(α′)|2. (4)
This means that the real part of the interference terms must vanish,
2ReA(α)A∗(α′) = A(α)A∗(α′) + A∗(α)A(α′) = 0. (5)
More generally, one may have a decoherence functional D(α, α′) with
ReD(α, α′) = 0, (6)
and then
p(α) = D(α, α). (7)
One then calls this set of α’s a decohering set of (coarse-grained) histories. One says
that probabilities are defined only for each member of such a decohering set. Then the
viewpoint is that such probabilities are the fundamental entities of the quantum theory.
Feeling that his task is basically completed, the theorist retires for the night.
(c) Testable conditional probabilities (subject of breakfast conversation) (Page and
Wootters 1983; Page 1986a, 1986b, 1987, 1988, 1989, 1991a, 1991b, 1992a). After a good
night’s sleep, the theorist, able to think more clearly, realizes that even decohering sets of
histories are too broad to be directly interpreted. Instead, it is a much narrower set of
conditional probabilities that we, living within the universe, can test. So far as we know,
each of these occurs on a single hypersurface (at a single “time”), and perhaps is also
highly localized on that hypersurface.
That is, we cannot directly compare things at different times, but only different
records at the same time. We cannot know the past except through its records in the
present, so it is only present records that we can really test. For example, we cannot
directly test the conditional probability that the electron has spin up at t = tf , given
that it had spin up at t = ti < tf , but only given that there are records at t = tf that
we interpret as indicating the electron had spin up at t = ti. Wheeler (1978) states this
even more strongly: “the past has no existence except as it is recorded in the present.”
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This principle should perhaps also be extended to say that we cannot directly com-
pare things at different locations either, so that all observations are really localized in space
as well as in time. Certainly each of my observations seems to be localized within the spa-
tial extent of my brain and the temporal extent of a single conscious moment, though it
appears to be an exaggeration to say it is localized to a single spacetime point. Whether
it is actually localized on a single hypersurface of a certain spatial extent is admittedly an
open question, but since the duration of a single conscious moment is so much shorter than
the apparent age of the universe, it seems reasonable and consistent with all we do know
to idealize each observation as occurring at a single time, on a single spatial hypersurface.
If the quantum state of the universe on a spatial hypersurface is given by a density
matrix ρ, the conditional probability of the result A , given a testable condition B, is
p(A|B) = Tr (PAPB ρ PB)
Tr (PB ρ PB)
=
Tr (PBPAPB ρ)
Tr (PB ρ)
, (8)
where PA = P
†
A = P
2
A and PB = P
†
B = P
2
B are the corresponding projection operators.
The testable conditional probabilities are then the subject of rational lunch conversation.
Of course, the theorist’s job is not completed with the mere formulation of Eq. (8):
one must discover the density matrix of the universe, formulate the projection operators,
and calculate the quantities in Eq. (8). Then there is the question of which results and
conditions are testable. One could avoid this problem by simply postulating that the con-
ditional probabilities associated with all projection operators PA and PB are meaningful
fundamental entities. However, most of these would not be readily interpretable, so there
would seem to be little motivation not to go back to the complex amplitudes (1) and (2)
as more fundamental.
A conclusion of these various meal discussions is that amplitudes seem to be the most
basic entities, but that if one wishes a more restricted set that can be readily interpreted
and tested, it does not seem to be going far enough to say they are the probabilities
for decohering sets of histories. Testable conditional probabilities appear in reality to be
restricted to a single hypersurface, not to histories, though even this restriction alone is
almost certainly not enough.
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2. Inaccessibility of coordinate time
As mentioned above, testable conditional probabilities (8) seem to be confined
to a single “time” (e.g., a spatial hypersurface in canonical gravity). Yet they cannot
depend on the value of the coordinate time labeling the hypersurface, which is completely
unobservable. One can give three arguments for this fact:
(a) For a closed universe, the Wheeler-DeWitt equation, Hψ = 0, implies that
ψ is independent of t.
(b) For an asymptotically-flat open universe, the long-range gravitational field
provides a superselection rule for the total energy, just as the long-range Coulomb electric
field provides a superselection rule for the total charge (Strocchi and Wightman 1974). This
means that phases between states of different energy are unmeasurable, so the coordinate-
time dependence of the density matrix ρ is not detectable (Page and Wootters 1983).
(c) In any case, one has no access to the coordinate time t, so one should
average over this inaccessible variable to get a density matrix for the other variables (Page
1989). This time-averaged density matrix in the Schro¨dinger picture is
ρ = 〈ρ(t)〉 ≡ lim
T→∞
1
2T
∫ T
−T
dt ρ(t) (9)
and in the Heisenberg picture is
ρ = 〈e−iHtρeiHt〉 ≡ lim
T→∞
1
2T
∫ T
−T
dt e−iHtρ eiHt. (10)
Without access to coordinate time t, we can only test conditional probabilities of the
form
p(A|B) = 〈Tr [PBPAPB ρ(t)]〉〈Tr (PB ρ(t))〉 =
Tr (PBPAPB ρ)
Tr (PB ρ)
=
〈Tr (PBPAPBe−iHtρ(0) eiHt)〉
〈Tr (PBe−iHtρ(0) eiHt)〉
=
Tr [〈eiHtPBPAPB e−iHt〉ρ(0)]
Tr [〈eiHtPB e−iHt〉ρ(0)] =
Tr [PBPAPB ρ(0)]
Tr [PB ρ(0)]
, (11)
where in the Schro¨dinger picture
O ≡ 〈eiHtOe−iHt〉 (12)
for an observable O without explicit time dependence, and in the Heisenberg picture
O ≡ 〈O(t)〉 = 〈eiHtO(0)e−iHt〉. (13)
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[H,O] = 0, (14)
so the observable O is stationary.
Thus testable conditional probabilities depend only on the stationary (time-
averaged) density matrix ρ, or alternatively, only on ρ(0) and stationary observables like
PB and PBPAPB ( 6= PB PA PB). In a constrained Hamiltonian system like canonical
quantum gravity, these observables, but not the individual projection operators, would
commute with the constraints (e.g., the Wheeler-DeWitt operator).
3. Observable evolution as dependence on clock time
Although unobservable coordinate time cannot be part of the condition B of
p(A|B) given by Eq. (8) or (11), the reading of a physical clock can be. The dependence
of p(A|B) upon the clock reading is then the observable time evolution of the system.
For simplicity, consider the case where the condition is entirely the reading of
a clock subsystem (C) with states |ψC(T )〉. Let
PB → PT = |ψC(T )〉〈ψC(T )| ⊗ IR, (15)
where IR is the unit operator for the rest (R) of the closed system (e.g., the rest of the
universe). Then
p(A|T ) = Tr (PTPAPT ρ)
Tr (PT ρ)
(16)
can vary with the clock time T.
In the special case that the clock does not interact with the rest of the system,
so
H = HC ⊗ IR + IC ⊗HR, (17)
and in the case that the result A does not concern the clock, so
PA = IC ⊗ PAR (18)
with PAR acting only on R, then the choice of clock states of reading T as
|ψC(T )〉 ≡ e−iHCT |ψC(0)〉 (19)
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leads to the following familiar-looking equation for the conditional probability of A given
the clock reading T :
p(A|T ) = tr
R
[PAR ρR(T )]. (20)
Here, the conditional density matrix for R at clock reading T is
ρR(T ) = tr
C
(PT ρPT )/Tr (PT ρ)
= e−iHRTρR(0)e
iHRT , (21)
thus evolving (in the Schro¨dinger picture) according to the von Neumann equation with
respect to the clock time T (Page and Wootters 1983).
In the more general case that the clock does interact with the rest of the system
and/or if the clock states are not defined by Eq. (19) (which gives
PT = e
iHTPT=0e
−iHT (22)
and has the somewhat undesirable consequence that PT PT ′ is not necessarily zero for
T 6= T ′), then generically p(A|T ) can be obtained from Eq. (16), but it will not have the
tr (PAR ρR) form of Eq. (20) with a unitarily evolved density matrix ρR(T ). In this more
general case clock time will not have been defined so that motion is so simple as Eqs. (20)
and (21), in contrast to the criterion of Misner, Thorne, and Wheeler (1973).
Karel Kucharˇ (1992, and at lunch during this conference) has given two objec-
tions to the conditional probability interpretation outlined here:
(a) The application of the condition violates the constraints. Eq. (8) or (11)
may be written as
p(A|B) = Tr (PA ρB), (23)
where the conditional density matrix
ρB = PB ρ PB/Tr (PB ρ) (24)
generally does not satisfy the constraints, e.g.,
[H, ρB] 6= 0, (25)
if
[H,PB] 6= 0. (26)
6
However, ρB is merely a calculational device to simplify Eq. (8) or (11) to Eq. (23). One
could instead rewrite Eq. (8) or (11) as
p(A|B) = Tr ρAB, (27)
where
ρAB = 〈PAPB ρPBPA〉/Tr 〈PB ρPB〉 (28)
does obey the constraints.
(b) The conditional probability formula (8) does not give the right propagators.
For example, if
PT1PT2 = PT2PT1 = 0, (29)
PA1PT1 = PT1PA1 6= 0, (30)
PA2PT2 = PT2PA2 6= 0, (31)
then Kucharˇ wants p(A2, T2 |A1, T1) to be the absolute square of the propagator (i.e.,
the transition probability) to go from A1 at T1 to A2 at T2, whereas the formula
p(A2, T2 |A1, T1) = Tr (PA2PT2PA1PT1 ρ PT1PA1PT2PA2)
Tr (PA1PT1 ρPT1PA1)
(32)
gives zero.
In response, I would say that the absolute square of the propagator is
∣∣〈A2 at T2 | A1 at T1〉∣∣2 = p(A2 at T2 | A1 at T1), (33)
that is, the probability to have A2 at T2 if one had A1 at T1, whereas Eq. (32) gives
p(A2, T2 | A1, T1) = p(A2 and T2 | A1 and T1), (34)
the probability that one has A2 and T2 if one has A1 and T1 on the same hypersurface.
Since Eq. (29) says that T1 and T2 are mutually exclusive, this probability is zero: one
cannot simultaneously have two distinct clock readings.
The conditional probability interpretation is dynamical in the sense that it gives
the T dependence of p(A|T ) by Eq. (16). However, it is not so dynamical as Kucharˇ
would like to give the transition probability of Eq. (33) directly. The reason it does not is
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that this quantity is not directly testable, since T1 and T2 are different conditions that
cannot be imposed together. At T = T2, one has no direct access to what happened at
T = T1. One must instead rely upon records, which can be checked at T2.
One way that one could try to calculate the transition probability (33) theoret-
ically is to try to construct a projection operator PA1T1 ( 6= PA1PT1) which, when applied
to ρ, gives a density matrix
ρA1T1 = PA1T1 ρPA1T1/Tr (PA1T1 ρ) (35)
which satisfies the constraints and which gives
p(A1|T1; ρA1T1) =
Tr (PT1PA1PT1 ρA1T1)
Tr (PT1 ρA1T1)
= 1. (36)
Then one could say
p(A2 at T2 | A1 at T1) = p(A2|T2; ρA1T1). (37)
However, it is not clear whether the answer is unique and whether it has certain desirable
properties. More importantly, it is not directly testable, and therefore it is rather ad hoc
which definition to propose for the transition probability.
4. The variation of entropy with clock time
The time asymmetry of the second law of thermodynamics should of course be
expressed in terms of physical clock time rather than in terms of unobservable coordinate
time (Page 1992b).
How to express entropy is more problematic. One mathematical expression is
ST = −Tr ρT ln ρT , (38)
ρT = PT ρPT /Tr (PT ρPT ). (39)
If
ρ = |ψ〉〈ψ|, (40)
a pure state, then
ρT = |ψT 〉〈ψT | (41)
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with
|ψT 〉 = PT |ψ〉/〈ψ|PT |ψ〉1/2, (42)
another pure state, so ST = 0.
But if ρ is not pure (e.g., is obtained from
ρ = |ψ〉〈ψ| (43)
pure but time dependent), then ST can exceed zero and vary with the clock time T.
Example: Consider two coupled spin- 12 systems in a vertical magnetic field,
with Hamiltonian
H =
1
4
~σC · ~σR + 1
2
σCz ⊗ IR +
1
2
IC ⊗ σRz +
3
4
I
= 2 | ↑↑〉〈↑↑ |+ 1
2
(| ↑↓〉+ | ↓↑〉)(〈↑↓ |+ 〈↓↑ |), (44)
giving a triplet and a singlet degenerate with the lowest state of the triplet. Take the
time-dependent pure state
|ψ〉 = 0.1
√
5
[
(e−it + 1)| ↑↓〉+ (e−it − 1)| ↓↑〉+ 4 | ↓↓〉], (45)
so the coordinate-time-averaged density matrix is
ρ = 0.1
(| ↑↓〉〈↑↓ |+ 2| ↑↓〉〈↓↓ |+ 2| ↓↓〉〈↑↓ |+ | ↓↑〉〈↓↑ |
− 2| ↓↑〉〈↓↓ | − 2| ↓↓〉〈↓↑ |+ 8| ↓↓〉〈↓↓ |). (46)
Let
PT =
1
2
(| ↑〉+ e−iT | ↓〉)(〈↑ |+ eiT 〈↓ |)
C
⊗ IR. (48)
This leads to
ρT = ρTC ⊗ ρTR (49)
with
ρTC =
1
2
(| ↑〉+ e−iT | ↓〉)(〈↑ |+ eiT 〈↓ |)
C
, (50)
ρTR = (10 + 4 cosT )
−1
[| ↑〉〈↑ | − 2| ↑〉〈↓ | − 2| ↓〉〈↑ |+ (9 + 4 cosT )| ↓〉〈↓ |]. (51)
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Therefore,
S(ρ(t)) = 0, S(ρ) = ln 10− 1.8 ln 3 ≈ 0.3251, (52)
ST = S(ρT ) = ln
(
10 + 4 cosT√
5 + 4 cosT
)
− 2
√
1 + (2 + cosT )2
5 + 2 cosT
× ln
(
5 + 2 cosT + 2
√
1 + (2 + cosT )2√
5 + 4 cosT
)
, (53)
which varies in a rather complicated way with clock time T.
Even when ρT is pure and gives ST = 0, we may divide the system into
subsystems and add the entropy of each subsystem density matrix (which ignores the
information or negentropy of the correlations between the subsystems):
ST,coarse = −
n∑
i=1
tr ρTi ln ρTi , (54)
ρTi = tr
j 6=i
PT ρPT /Tr (PT ρ). (55)
Example: Consider three spin- 12 systems in a vertical magnetic field, with
Hamiltonian
H =
1
2
σCz ⊗ IR1 ⊗ IR2 +
1
2
IC ⊗ σR1z ⊗ IR2
+
1
2
IC ⊗ IR1 ⊗ σR2z +
1
4
IC ⊗ ~σR1 · ~σR2 + 1
4
I
= 2| ↑↑↑〉〈↑↑↑ |
+
1
2
(| ↑↑↓〉+ | ↑↓↑〉)(〈↑↑↓ |+ 〈↑↓↑ |)+ | ↓↑↑〉〈↓↑↑ |
− 1
2
(| ↓↑↓〉 − | ↓↓↑〉)(〈↓↑↓ | − 〈↓↓↑ |)− | ↓↓↓〉〈↓↓↓ |, (56)
so the first spin acts as a noninteracting clock and the remaining two have the same
spin-spin coupling as the previous example. Take a pure-state linear combination of the
zero-energy eigenvectors,
|ψ〉 = 1
2
(| ↑↑↓〉 − | ↑↓↑〉+ | ↓↑↓〉+ | ↓↓↑〉), (57)
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so Eq. (40) holds. Let PT be given by Eq. (48) again, except that now IR is the 4× 4
unit matrix for the last two spins. This gives ρT of the pure form (41) with
|ψT 〉 = 2−1/2
(| ↑〉+ e−iT | ↓〉)
C
⊗ 1
2
[
(eiT + 1)| ↑↓〉+ (eiT − 1)| ↓↑〉]
R
, (58)
so ρT again factorizes as in Eq. (49) between the clock and the rest, with ρTC given by
Eq. (50) and
ρTR =
1
2
[
(1 + cosT )| ↑↓〉〈↑↓ | − i sinT | ↑↓〉〈↓↑ |
+ i sinT | ↓↑〉〈↑↓ |+ (1− cosT )| ↓↑〉〈↓↑ |], (59)
a pure state which does not factorize between the last two spins. The reduced density
matrices of the two spins are
ρTR1 =
1
2
IR1 +
1
2
cosT (| ↑〉〈↑ | − | ↓〉〈↓ |)R1 , (60)
ρTR2 =
1
2
IR2 − 1
2
cosT (| ↑〉〈↑ | − | ↓〉〈↓ |)R2 , (61)
each with eigenvalues
p1 = cos
2 1
2
T, p2 = sin
2 1
2
T. (62)
Hence, the coarse-grained entropy given by Eq. (54) is
ST,coarse = S(ρTC) + S(ρTR1) + S(ρTR2)
= −2 cos2 1
2
T ln cos2
1
2
T − 2 sin2 1
2
T ln sin2
1
2
T, (63)
oscillating between 0 at T = nπ and 2 ln 2 at T = (n+ 1/2)π.
Although they can vary with clock time, the mathematical and coarse-grained
entropies defined by Eqs. (38) and (54) above are not really observables. One would like
a truly observable entropy operator Ŝ and then define the clock-time-dependent entropy
as its conditional expectation value:
ST,observable = E(Ŝ|T ) = Tr (PT ŜPT ρ)/Tr (PT ρ). (64)
Can one find suitable definitions of Ŝ and T so that ST,observable increases
fairly monotonically with T for the actual density matrix ρ of the universe?
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I have benefited from discussions on these points at the conference with Bryce
DeWitt, Murray Gell-Mann, James Hartle, Karel Kucharˇ, Emil Mottola and William Un-
ruh. Financial assistance has been provided by the Canadian Institute for Advanced
Research, the Fundacio´n Banco Bilbao Vizcaya, the National Science Foundation, and the
Natural Sciences and Engineering Research Council.
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Discussion
Karel Kucharˇ: You always apply the conditional probability formula to calculate
the conditional probability of a projector at a single instant of an internal clock time.
You never apply it to answering the fundamental DYNAMICAL question of the internal
Schro¨dinger interpretation, namely, “If one finds the particle at Q′ at the time T ′, what
is the probability of finding it at Q′′ at the time T ′′? ” By your formula, that conditional
probability differs from zero only if T ′ = T ′′ and Q′ = Q′′. In brief, your interpretation
prohibits the time to flow and the system to move!
For me, this virtually amounts to a reductio ad absurdum of the conditional proba-
bility proposal. One can trace this feature back to the fact that the conventional derivation
of the conditional probability formula amounts to the violation of the super-Hamiltonian
constraint.
Don Page: At this time I cannot give much more of an answer than I did in my
lecture (which is slightly expanded for the Proceedings). In my viewpoint, only quantities
at a single instant of time are directly accessible, and so one cannot directly test the two-
time probability you discuss. One could instead at one time test the conditional probability
that the particle is at Q′′, given that the time is T ′′ and that at this time there is a
record indicating that the particle was at Q′ at the time T ′. However, there is no direct
way to test whether the record is accurate, though one can check whether different records
show consistency. After all, that is the only way we have to increase our confidence in the
existence of historical events.
Karel Kucharˇ: Don, you are the first person I met who simultaneously believes in
the existence of many worlds and is a solipsist of an instant.
Don Page: I believe that different instants, i.e., different clock times, are actually
examples of the different worlds. They all exist, but each observation, and its associated
conditional probability, occurs at one single time (assuming that the condition includes or
implies a precise value of the clock time in question). We can only directly observe and
be aware of the world, and the time, in and at which we exist, though the correlations
in memories and other structures we observe in one world give indirect evidence of other
worlds, and other clock times, in the full quantum state of the universe. I do not deny the
existence of historical events at different instants of clock time, but I do not believe that
they have conditional probabilities (given our conditions here and now) exactly equal to
unity, or even that they can be precisely assigned any probabilities at all, say in the sense
of Eq. (7) when Eq. (6) holds. In any case, any imputed probabilities for events in the
past or future cannot be directly tested.
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